The instructions came from senior officers in a unit of Russia’s Federal Security Service (FSB) with a pseudonym – the Operational Intelligence Department – but an ominous mission: to ensure the decapitation of the Ukrainian government and oversee the installation of a pro-Russian regime. The messages were a measure of confidence in this bold plan. So confident were FSB operatives that they would soon control the levers of power in Kyiv, according to Ukrainian and Western officials, that they spent the days leading up to the war arranging safe houses or accommodation in informants’ apartments and other locations for the planned influx of personnel. “Nice trip!” one FSB officer told another sent to oversee the expected takeover, according to the intercepted communications. There is no indication that the recipient ever made it to the capital, as the FSB’s plans collapsed midway retreat of Russian forces in the first months of the war. The communications revealing these preparations are part of a wider trove of sensitive material obtained by Ukraine and other security agencies and reviewed by The Washington Post. They offer rare insight into the activities of the FSB – a sprawling agency that bears enormous responsibility for the failed Russian war plan and the hubris that fueled it. An agency whose remit includes internal security in Russia as well as espionage in former Soviet states, the FSB has spent decades spying on Ukraine, trying to bring its institutions to account, paying off officials and working to prevent any perceived drift towards the West . No aspect of the FSB’s intelligence mission outside of Russia was more important than penetrating all levels of Ukrainian society. Story continues below ad Story continues below ad And yet, the agency has failed to incapacitate Ukraine’s government, foment any semblance of pro-Russian influence, or disrupt the power of President Volodymyr Zelensky. Its analysts either did not understand how forcefully Ukraine would respond, Ukrainian and Western officials said, or they did but could not or would not convey such sober assessments to Russian President Vladimir Putin. [Hubris and isolation led Vladimir Putin to misjudge Ukraine] The humiliations of the Russian military have largely overshadowed the failures of the FSB and other intelligence agencies. But in some ways, these were even more incomprehensible and consequential, said officials, who underpin almost every war decision in the Kremlin. “The Russians were wrong by a mile,” said a senior US official with regular access to classified information about Russia and its security services. “They made an entire war effort to seize strategic objectives that were beyond their capabilities,” the official said. “Russia’s mistake was really fundamental and strategic.” Ukraine’s security services have a vested interest in discrediting Russia’s spy services, but key details from the vault have been confirmed by Western government officials. The files show that the FSB unit responsible for Ukraine grew in size in the months leading up to the war and relied on the support of a vast network of paid agents in Ukraine’s security apparatus. Some have complied and are sabotaging Ukraine’s defenses, officials said, while others appear to have pocketed their FSB payments but were reluctant to do the Kremlin’s bidding when the fighting broke out. There are records that add to the mystery of Russian miscalculations. Extensive polls conducted for the FSB show that large sections of Ukraine’s population were prepared to resist Russian encroachment and that any expectation that Russian forces would be hailed as liberators was unfounded. Even so, officials said, the FSB continued to feed the Kremlin rosy estimates that Ukraine’s masses would welcome the arrival of the Russian military and the restoration of Moscow-friendly rule. “There was a lot of wishful thinking in the GRU and the military, but it started with the FSB,” said a senior Western security official, using the GRU acronym for Russia’s main military intelligence agency. “The sense that there would be flowers strewn in their wake — this was an FSB exercise.” He and other security officials in Ukraine, the United States and Europe spoke on condition of anonymity to discuss sensitive information. Story continues below ad Story continues below ad Adhering to these false assumptions, officials said, the FSB supported a war plan based on the idea that a blitzkrieg in Kyiv would topple the government within days. Zelensky would be dead, captured or exiled, creating a political vacuum for FSB agents to fill. Instead, FSB agents who had at some point reached the outskirts of Kiev had to do so retreat to Russian forces, Ukrainian security officials said. Instead of presiding over the formation of a new government in Kyiv, officials said, the FSB is now facing tough questions in Moscow about what its long history of operations against Ukraine accomplished — and the large sums that financed them. The FSB did not respond to requests for comment. The FSB’s plans and the efforts of Ukraine’s security services to thwart them—backed by the CIA, Britain’s MI6 and other Western intelligence agencies—are part of a shadow war that has taken place alongside Russia’s military campaign. It’s a conflict that was underway long before the February 24 invasion, and its battle lines are blurred by the tangled, overlapping histories of Russian agencies and their Ukrainian counterparts that began as descendants of the Soviet-era KGB. Six months into the war, neither side appears to have the clear upper hand. Ukraine’s security services have scored notable victories. Earlier, a Ukrainian non-governmental organization published what it described as a list of FSB officials linked to the war effort, publishing the identities and passport numbers of dozens of alleged spies in a move intended to disrupt the agency’s plans and rattle her staff. A person connected to the NGO, which is called Myrotvorets, or Peacemaker, said the data was obtained by Ukrainian security services. The person spoke on condition of anonymity, citing threats to his safety. Ivan Bakanov, who headed the SBU, Ukraine’s main internal security agency, at the start of the war. (Emily Sabens/The Washington Post; Efrem Lukatsky/AP; iStock) At the same time, Ukraine’s main internal security service, the SBU, struggled to rid its ranks of Russian moles and saboteurs. Several senior officers were arrested and branded traitors by Zelensky, who took the extraordinary step in July of removing SBU Director Ivan Bakanov — a childhood friend — from his post. Putin is not believed to have taken similar action against any of his spy chiefs, despite the extent of their miscalculations. “If your security services put such a high priority on understanding Ukraine, and your military plan is based on that understanding, how could they get it so wrong?” said William B. Taylor Jr., who served two terms as U.S. ambassador to Ukraine, including acting in 2019. “How could they assume that Ukrainians would not fight, that President Zelensky would not resist so bravely? The disconnect must be somewhere between the FSB and the top.”
II
Among those planning to arrive in Kyiv in late February were Igor Kovalenko, identified by Ukraine as a senior FSB officer who for years was the main handler of some of Ukraine’s most prominent politicians and government officials secretly on the Kremlin’s payroll, including members of the opposition party chaired by Viktor Medvedchuk, a close friend of Putin. An exchange Kovalenko had with an FSB subordinate on February 18 suggested he had his eye on an apartment in Kiev’s leafy Obolon neighborhood, overlooking the Dnieper River. The intercepted communications show that Kovalenko asked for the apartment’s address and contact information for an FSB informant who occupied it. Ukrainian authorities said the resident was subsequently arrested and questioned. Igor Kovalenko, identified by Ukraine as a senior FSB officer, appeared to have his eye on an informant’s apartment in a building in Kiev’s Obolon neighborhood. (Emily Sabens/The Washington Post, Heidi Levine for The Washington Post, iStock) Kovalenko’s subordinate sent back the address, phone numbers and code words used to contact the whistleblower, who served in Zelensky’s government, Ukrainian officials said. Officials declined to identify the informant but said he admitted to being instructed by the FSB days before the raid to pack his belongings, leave his keys and leave the capital to ensure his personal safety during the initial phase of the war. Other whistleblowers arrested by Ukrainian authorities have provided similar accounts, one of the officials said. “They had been told, ‘When you come back, everything will be different.’ “ Details published by Peacemaker and confirmed by Ukrainian security officials describe Kovalenko as a 47-year veteran of the spy agency who in recent years was responsible for managing the agency’s secret ties to Ukraine’s parliament and the main pro-Russian party. Kovalenko did not respond to requests for comment. Ukrainian authorities believe Kovalenko may have been just a few miles from the capital in March, escorting Russian forces out of the city. But the FSB team tasked with staging operations in Kyiv had to abandon that plan when Russian forces began to retreat, officials said.
title: “Fsb Mistakes Played A Key Role In Russia S Failed War Plans In Ukraine Klmat” ShowToc: true date: “2022-11-04” author: “Margie Albert”
The instructions came from senior officers in a unit of Russia’s Federal Security Service (FSB) with a pseudonym – the Operational Intelligence Department – but an ominous mission: to ensure the decapitation of the Ukrainian government and oversee the installation of a pro-Russian regime. The messages were a measure of confidence in this bold plan. So confident were FSB operatives that they would soon control the levers of power in Kyiv, according to Ukrainian and Western officials, that they spent the days leading up to the war arranging safe houses or accommodation in informants’ apartments and other locations for the planned influx of personnel. “Nice trip!” one FSB officer told another sent to oversee the expected takeover, according to the intercepted communications. There is no indication that the recipient ever made it to the capital, as the FSB’s plans collapsed midway retreat of Russian forces in the first months of the war. The communications revealing these preparations are part of a wider trove of sensitive material obtained by Ukraine and other security agencies and reviewed by The Washington Post. They offer rare insight into the activities of the FSB – a sprawling agency that bears enormous responsibility for the failed Russian war plan and the hubris that fueled it. An agency whose remit includes internal security in Russia as well as espionage in former Soviet states, the FSB has spent decades spying on Ukraine, trying to bring its institutions to account, paying off officials and working to prevent any perceived drift towards the West . No aspect of the FSB’s intelligence mission outside of Russia was more important than penetrating all levels of Ukrainian society. Story continues below ad Story continues below ad And yet, the agency has failed to incapacitate Ukraine’s government, foment any semblance of pro-Russian influence, or disrupt the power of President Volodymyr Zelensky. Its analysts either did not understand how forcefully Ukraine would respond, Ukrainian and Western officials said, or they did but could not or would not convey such sober assessments to Russian President Vladimir Putin. [Hubris and isolation led Vladimir Putin to misjudge Ukraine] The humiliations of the Russian military have largely overshadowed the failures of the FSB and other intelligence agencies. But in some ways, these were even more incomprehensible and consequential, said officials, who underpin almost every war decision in the Kremlin. “The Russians were wrong by a mile,” said a senior US official with regular access to classified information about Russia and its security services. “They made an entire war effort to seize strategic objectives that were beyond their capabilities,” the official said. “Russia’s mistake was really fundamental and strategic.” Ukraine’s security services have a vested interest in discrediting Russia’s spy services, but key details from the vault have been confirmed by Western government officials. The files show that the FSB unit responsible for Ukraine grew in size in the months leading up to the war and relied on the support of a vast network of paid agents in Ukraine’s security apparatus. Some have complied and are sabotaging Ukraine’s defenses, officials said, while others appear to have pocketed their FSB payments but were reluctant to do the Kremlin’s bidding when the fighting broke out. There are records that add to the mystery of Russian miscalculations. Extensive polls conducted for the FSB show that large sections of Ukraine’s population were prepared to resist Russian encroachment and that any expectation that Russian forces would be hailed as liberators was unfounded. Even so, officials said, the FSB continued to feed the Kremlin rosy estimates that Ukraine’s masses would welcome the arrival of the Russian military and the restoration of Moscow-friendly rule. “There was a lot of wishful thinking in the GRU and the military, but it started with the FSB,” said a senior Western security official, using the GRU acronym for Russia’s main military intelligence agency. “The sense that there would be flowers strewn in their wake — this was an FSB exercise.” He and other security officials in Ukraine, the United States and Europe spoke on condition of anonymity to discuss sensitive information. Story continues below ad Story continues below ad Adhering to these false assumptions, officials said, the FSB supported a war plan based on the idea that a blitzkrieg in Kyiv would topple the government within days. Zelensky would be dead, captured or exiled, creating a political vacuum for FSB agents to fill. Instead, FSB agents who had at some point reached the outskirts of Kiev had to do so retreat to Russian forces, Ukrainian security officials said. Instead of presiding over the formation of a new government in Kyiv, officials said, the FSB is now facing tough questions in Moscow about what its long history of operations against Ukraine accomplished — and the large sums that financed them. The FSB did not respond to requests for comment. The FSB’s plans and the efforts of Ukraine’s security services to thwart them—backed by the CIA, Britain’s MI6 and other Western intelligence agencies—are part of a shadow war that has taken place alongside Russia’s military campaign. It’s a conflict that was underway long before the February 24 invasion, and its battle lines are blurred by the tangled, overlapping histories of Russian agencies and their Ukrainian counterparts that began as descendants of the Soviet-era KGB. Six months into the war, neither side appears to have the clear upper hand. Ukraine’s security services have scored notable victories. Earlier, a Ukrainian non-governmental organization published what it described as a list of FSB officials linked to the war effort, publishing the identities and passport numbers of dozens of alleged spies in a move intended to disrupt the agency’s plans and rattle her staff. A person connected to the NGO, which is called Myrotvorets, or Peacemaker, said the data was obtained by Ukrainian security services. The person spoke on condition of anonymity, citing threats to his safety. Ivan Bakanov, who headed the SBU, Ukraine’s main internal security agency, at the start of the war. (Emily Sabens/The Washington Post; Efrem Lukatsky/AP; iStock) At the same time, Ukraine’s main internal security service, the SBU, struggled to rid its ranks of Russian moles and saboteurs. Several senior officers were arrested and branded traitors by Zelensky, who took the extraordinary step in July of removing SBU Director Ivan Bakanov — a childhood friend — from his post. Putin is not believed to have taken similar action against any of his spy chiefs, despite the extent of their miscalculations. “If your security services put such a high priority on understanding Ukraine, and your military plan is based on that understanding, how could they get it so wrong?” said William B. Taylor Jr., who served two terms as U.S. ambassador to Ukraine, including acting in 2019. “How could they assume that Ukrainians would not fight, that President Zelensky would not resist so bravely? The disconnect must be somewhere between the FSB and the top.”
II
Among those planning to arrive in Kyiv in late February were Igor Kovalenko, identified by Ukraine as a senior FSB officer who for years was the main handler of some of Ukraine’s most prominent politicians and government officials secretly on the Kremlin’s payroll, including members of the opposition party chaired by Viktor Medvedchuk, a close friend of Putin. An exchange Kovalenko had with an FSB subordinate on February 18 suggested he had his eye on an apartment in Kiev’s leafy Obolon neighborhood, overlooking the Dnieper River. The intercepted communications show that Kovalenko asked for the apartment’s address and contact information for an FSB informant who occupied it. Ukrainian authorities said the resident was subsequently arrested and questioned. Igor Kovalenko, identified by Ukraine as a senior FSB officer, appeared to have his eye on an informant’s apartment in a building in Kiev’s Obolon neighborhood. (Emily Sabens/The Washington Post, Heidi Levine for The Washington Post, iStock) Kovalenko’s subordinate sent back the address, phone numbers and code words used to contact the whistleblower, who served in Zelensky’s government, Ukrainian officials said. Officials declined to identify the informant but said he admitted to being instructed by the FSB days before the raid to pack his belongings, leave his keys and leave the capital to ensure his personal safety during the initial phase of the war. Other whistleblowers arrested by Ukrainian authorities have provided similar accounts, one of the officials said. “They had been told, ‘When you come back, everything will be different.’ “ Details published by Peacemaker and confirmed by Ukrainian security officials describe Kovalenko as a 47-year veteran of the spy agency who in recent years was responsible for managing the agency’s secret ties to Ukraine’s parliament and the main pro-Russian party. Kovalenko did not respond to requests for comment. Ukrainian authorities believe Kovalenko may have been just a few miles from the capital in March, escorting Russian forces out of the city. But the FSB team tasked with staging operations in Kyiv had to abandon that plan when Russian forces began to retreat, officials said.
title: “Fsb Mistakes Played A Key Role In Russia S Failed War Plans In Ukraine Klmat” ShowToc: true date: “2022-12-01” author: “Darrell Herron”
The instructions came from senior officers in a unit of Russia’s Federal Security Service (FSB) with a pseudonym – the Operational Intelligence Department – but an ominous mission: to ensure the decapitation of the Ukrainian government and oversee the installation of a pro-Russian regime. The messages were a measure of confidence in this bold plan. So confident were FSB operatives that they would soon control the levers of power in Kyiv, according to Ukrainian and Western officials, that they spent the days leading up to the war arranging safe houses or accommodation in informants’ apartments and other locations for the planned influx of personnel. “Nice trip!” one FSB officer told another sent to oversee the expected takeover, according to the intercepted communications. There is no indication that the recipient ever made it to the capital, as the FSB’s plans collapsed midway retreat of Russian forces in the first months of the war. The communications revealing these preparations are part of a wider trove of sensitive material obtained by Ukraine and other security agencies and reviewed by The Washington Post. They offer rare insight into the activities of the FSB – a sprawling agency that bears enormous responsibility for the failed Russian war plan and the hubris that fueled it. An agency whose remit includes internal security in Russia as well as espionage in former Soviet states, the FSB has spent decades spying on Ukraine, trying to bring its institutions to account, paying off officials and working to prevent any perceived drift towards the West . No aspect of the FSB’s intelligence mission outside of Russia was more important than penetrating all levels of Ukrainian society. Story continues below ad Story continues below ad And yet, the agency has failed to incapacitate Ukraine’s government, foment any semblance of pro-Russian influence, or disrupt the power of President Volodymyr Zelensky. Its analysts either did not understand how forcefully Ukraine would respond, Ukrainian and Western officials said, or they did but could not or would not convey such sober assessments to Russian President Vladimir Putin. [Hubris and isolation led Vladimir Putin to misjudge Ukraine] The humiliations of the Russian military have largely overshadowed the failures of the FSB and other intelligence agencies. But in some ways, these were even more incomprehensible and consequential, said officials, who underpin almost every war decision in the Kremlin. “The Russians were wrong by a mile,” said a senior US official with regular access to classified information about Russia and its security services. “They made an entire war effort to seize strategic objectives that were beyond their capabilities,” the official said. “Russia’s mistake was really fundamental and strategic.” Ukraine’s security services have a vested interest in discrediting Russia’s spy services, but key details from the vault have been confirmed by Western government officials. The files show that the FSB unit responsible for Ukraine grew in size in the months leading up to the war and relied on the support of a vast network of paid agents in Ukraine’s security apparatus. Some have complied and are sabotaging Ukraine’s defenses, officials said, while others appear to have pocketed their FSB payments but were reluctant to do the Kremlin’s bidding when the fighting broke out. There are records that add to the mystery of Russian miscalculations. Extensive polls conducted for the FSB show that large sections of Ukraine’s population were prepared to resist Russian encroachment and that any expectation that Russian forces would be hailed as liberators was unfounded. Even so, officials said, the FSB continued to feed the Kremlin rosy estimates that Ukraine’s masses would welcome the arrival of the Russian military and the restoration of Moscow-friendly rule. “There was a lot of wishful thinking in the GRU and the military, but it started with the FSB,” said a senior Western security official, using the GRU acronym for Russia’s main military intelligence agency. “The sense that there would be flowers strewn in their wake — this was an FSB exercise.” He and other security officials in Ukraine, the United States and Europe spoke on condition of anonymity to discuss sensitive information. Story continues below ad Story continues below ad Adhering to these false assumptions, officials said, the FSB supported a war plan based on the idea that a blitzkrieg in Kyiv would topple the government within days. Zelensky would be dead, captured or exiled, creating a political vacuum for FSB agents to fill. Instead, FSB agents who had at some point reached the outskirts of Kiev had to do so retreat to Russian forces, Ukrainian security officials said. Instead of presiding over the formation of a new government in Kyiv, officials said, the FSB is now facing tough questions in Moscow about what its long history of operations against Ukraine accomplished — and the large sums that financed them. The FSB did not respond to requests for comment. The FSB’s plans and the efforts of Ukraine’s security services to thwart them—backed by the CIA, Britain’s MI6 and other Western intelligence agencies—are part of a shadow war that has taken place alongside Russia’s military campaign. It’s a conflict that was underway long before the February 24 invasion, and its battle lines are blurred by the tangled, overlapping histories of Russian agencies and their Ukrainian counterparts that began as descendants of the Soviet-era KGB. Six months into the war, neither side appears to have the clear upper hand. Ukraine’s security services have scored notable victories. Earlier, a Ukrainian non-governmental organization published what it described as a list of FSB officials linked to the war effort, publishing the identities and passport numbers of dozens of alleged spies in a move intended to disrupt the agency’s plans and rattle her staff. A person connected to the NGO, which is called Myrotvorets, or Peacemaker, said the data was obtained by Ukrainian security services. The person spoke on condition of anonymity, citing threats to his safety. Ivan Bakanov, who headed the SBU, Ukraine’s main internal security agency, at the start of the war. (Emily Sabens/The Washington Post; Efrem Lukatsky/AP; iStock) At the same time, Ukraine’s main internal security service, the SBU, struggled to rid its ranks of Russian moles and saboteurs. Several senior officers were arrested and branded traitors by Zelensky, who took the extraordinary step in July of removing SBU Director Ivan Bakanov — a childhood friend — from his post. Putin is not believed to have taken similar action against any of his spy chiefs, despite the extent of their miscalculations. “If your security services put such a high priority on understanding Ukraine, and your military plan is based on that understanding, how could they get it so wrong?” said William B. Taylor Jr., who served two terms as U.S. ambassador to Ukraine, including acting in 2019. “How could they assume that Ukrainians would not fight, that President Zelensky would not resist so bravely? The disconnect must be somewhere between the FSB and the top.”
II
Among those planning to arrive in Kyiv in late February were Igor Kovalenko, identified by Ukraine as a senior FSB officer who for years was the main handler of some of Ukraine’s most prominent politicians and government officials secretly on the Kremlin’s payroll, including members of the opposition party chaired by Viktor Medvedchuk, a close friend of Putin. An exchange Kovalenko had with an FSB subordinate on February 18 suggested he had his eye on an apartment in Kiev’s leafy Obolon neighborhood, overlooking the Dnieper River. The intercepted communications show that Kovalenko asked for the apartment’s address and contact information for an FSB informant who occupied it. Ukrainian authorities said the resident was subsequently arrested and questioned. Igor Kovalenko, identified by Ukraine as a senior FSB officer, appeared to have his eye on an informant’s apartment in a building in Kiev’s Obolon neighborhood. (Emily Sabens/The Washington Post, Heidi Levine for The Washington Post, iStock) Kovalenko’s subordinate sent back the address, phone numbers and code words used to contact the whistleblower, who served in Zelensky’s government, Ukrainian officials said. Officials declined to identify the informant but said he admitted to being instructed by the FSB days before the raid to pack his belongings, leave his keys and leave the capital to ensure his personal safety during the initial phase of the war. Other whistleblowers arrested by Ukrainian authorities have provided similar accounts, one of the officials said. “They had been told, ‘When you come back, everything will be different.’ “ Details published by Peacemaker and confirmed by Ukrainian security officials describe Kovalenko as a 47-year veteran of the spy agency who in recent years was responsible for managing the agency’s secret ties to Ukraine’s parliament and the main pro-Russian party. Kovalenko did not respond to requests for comment. Ukrainian authorities believe Kovalenko may have been just a few miles from the capital in March, escorting Russian forces out of the city. But the FSB team tasked with staging operations in Kyiv had to abandon that plan when Russian forces began to retreat, officials said.
title: “Fsb Mistakes Played A Key Role In Russia S Failed War Plans In Ukraine Klmat” ShowToc: true date: “2022-10-27” author: “Lily Love”
The instructions came from senior officers in a unit of Russia’s Federal Security Service (FSB) with a pseudonym – the Operational Intelligence Department – but an ominous mission: to ensure the decapitation of the Ukrainian government and oversee the installation of a pro-Russian regime. The messages were a measure of confidence in this bold plan. So confident were FSB operatives that they would soon control the levers of power in Kyiv, according to Ukrainian and Western officials, that they spent the days leading up to the war arranging safe houses or accommodation in informants’ apartments and other locations for the planned influx of personnel. “Nice trip!” one FSB officer told another sent to oversee the expected takeover, according to the intercepted communications. There is no indication that the recipient ever made it to the capital, as the FSB’s plans collapsed midway retreat of Russian forces in the first months of the war. The communications revealing these preparations are part of a wider trove of sensitive material obtained by Ukraine and other security agencies and reviewed by The Washington Post. They offer rare insight into the activities of the FSB – a sprawling agency that bears enormous responsibility for the failed Russian war plan and the hubris that fueled it. An agency whose remit includes internal security in Russia as well as espionage in former Soviet states, the FSB has spent decades spying on Ukraine, trying to bring its institutions to account, paying off officials and working to prevent any perceived drift towards the West . No aspect of the FSB’s intelligence mission outside of Russia was more important than penetrating all levels of Ukrainian society. Story continues below ad Story continues below ad And yet, the agency has failed to incapacitate Ukraine’s government, foment any semblance of pro-Russian influence, or disrupt the power of President Volodymyr Zelensky. Its analysts either did not understand how forcefully Ukraine would respond, Ukrainian and Western officials said, or they did but could not or would not convey such sober assessments to Russian President Vladimir Putin. [Hubris and isolation led Vladimir Putin to misjudge Ukraine] The humiliations of the Russian military have largely overshadowed the failures of the FSB and other intelligence agencies. But in some ways, these were even more incomprehensible and consequential, said officials, who underpin almost every war decision in the Kremlin. “The Russians were wrong by a mile,” said a senior US official with regular access to classified information about Russia and its security services. “They made an entire war effort to seize strategic objectives that were beyond their capabilities,” the official said. “Russia’s mistake was really fundamental and strategic.” Ukraine’s security services have a vested interest in discrediting Russia’s spy services, but key details from the vault have been confirmed by Western government officials. The files show that the FSB unit responsible for Ukraine grew in size in the months leading up to the war and relied on the support of a vast network of paid agents in Ukraine’s security apparatus. Some have complied and are sabotaging Ukraine’s defenses, officials said, while others appear to have pocketed their FSB payments but were reluctant to do the Kremlin’s bidding when the fighting broke out. There are records that add to the mystery of Russian miscalculations. Extensive polls conducted for the FSB show that large sections of Ukraine’s population were prepared to resist Russian encroachment and that any expectation that Russian forces would be hailed as liberators was unfounded. Even so, officials said, the FSB continued to feed the Kremlin rosy estimates that Ukraine’s masses would welcome the arrival of the Russian military and the restoration of Moscow-friendly rule. “There was a lot of wishful thinking in the GRU and the military, but it started with the FSB,” said a senior Western security official, using the GRU acronym for Russia’s main military intelligence agency. “The sense that there would be flowers strewn in their wake — this was an FSB exercise.” He and other security officials in Ukraine, the United States and Europe spoke on condition of anonymity to discuss sensitive information. Story continues below ad Story continues below ad Adhering to these false assumptions, officials said, the FSB supported a war plan based on the idea that a blitzkrieg in Kyiv would topple the government within days. Zelensky would be dead, captured or exiled, creating a political vacuum for FSB agents to fill. Instead, FSB agents who had at some point reached the outskirts of Kiev had to do so retreat to Russian forces, Ukrainian security officials said. Instead of presiding over the formation of a new government in Kyiv, officials said, the FSB is now facing tough questions in Moscow about what its long history of operations against Ukraine accomplished — and the large sums that financed them. The FSB did not respond to requests for comment. The FSB’s plans and the efforts of Ukraine’s security services to thwart them—backed by the CIA, Britain’s MI6 and other Western intelligence agencies—are part of a shadow war that has taken place alongside Russia’s military campaign. It’s a conflict that was underway long before the February 24 invasion, and its battle lines are blurred by the tangled, overlapping histories of Russian agencies and their Ukrainian counterparts that began as descendants of the Soviet-era KGB. Six months into the war, neither side appears to have the clear upper hand. Ukraine’s security services have scored notable victories. Earlier, a Ukrainian non-governmental organization published what it described as a list of FSB officials linked to the war effort, publishing the identities and passport numbers of dozens of alleged spies in a move intended to disrupt the agency’s plans and rattle her staff. A person connected to the NGO, which is called Myrotvorets, or Peacemaker, said the data was obtained by Ukrainian security services. The person spoke on condition of anonymity, citing threats to his safety. Ivan Bakanov, who headed the SBU, Ukraine’s main internal security agency, at the start of the war. (Emily Sabens/The Washington Post; Efrem Lukatsky/AP; iStock) At the same time, Ukraine’s main internal security service, the SBU, struggled to rid its ranks of Russian moles and saboteurs. Several senior officers were arrested and branded traitors by Zelensky, who took the extraordinary step in July of removing SBU Director Ivan Bakanov — a childhood friend — from his post. Putin is not believed to have taken similar action against any of his spy chiefs, despite the extent of their miscalculations. “If your security services put such a high priority on understanding Ukraine, and your military plan is based on that understanding, how could they get it so wrong?” said William B. Taylor Jr., who served two terms as U.S. ambassador to Ukraine, including acting in 2019. “How could they assume that Ukrainians would not fight, that President Zelensky would not resist so bravely? The disconnect must be somewhere between the FSB and the top.”
II
Among those planning to arrive in Kyiv in late February were Igor Kovalenko, identified by Ukraine as a senior FSB officer who for years was the main handler of some of Ukraine’s most prominent politicians and government officials secretly on the Kremlin’s payroll, including members of the opposition party chaired by Viktor Medvedchuk, a close friend of Putin. An exchange Kovalenko had with an FSB subordinate on February 18 suggested he had his eye on an apartment in Kiev’s leafy Obolon neighborhood, overlooking the Dnieper River. The intercepted communications show that Kovalenko asked for the apartment’s address and contact information for an FSB informant who occupied it. Ukrainian authorities said the resident was subsequently arrested and questioned. Igor Kovalenko, identified by Ukraine as a senior FSB officer, appeared to have his eye on an informant’s apartment in a building in Kiev’s Obolon neighborhood. (Emily Sabens/The Washington Post, Heidi Levine for The Washington Post, iStock) Kovalenko’s subordinate sent back the address, phone numbers and code words used to contact the whistleblower, who served in Zelensky’s government, Ukrainian officials said. Officials declined to identify the informant but said he admitted to being instructed by the FSB days before the raid to pack his belongings, leave his keys and leave the capital to ensure his personal safety during the initial phase of the war. Other whistleblowers arrested by Ukrainian authorities have provided similar accounts, one of the officials said. “They had been told, ‘When you come back, everything will be different.’ “ Details published by Peacemaker and confirmed by Ukrainian security officials describe Kovalenko as a 47-year veteran of the spy agency who in recent years was responsible for managing the agency’s secret ties to Ukraine’s parliament and the main pro-Russian party. Kovalenko did not respond to requests for comment. Ukrainian authorities believe Kovalenko may have been just a few miles from the capital in March, escorting Russian forces out of the city. But the FSB team tasked with staging operations in Kyiv had to abandon that plan when Russian forces began to retreat, officials said.
title: “Fsb Mistakes Played A Key Role In Russia S Failed War Plans In Ukraine Klmat” ShowToc: true date: “2022-11-15” author: “William Burrell”
The instructions came from senior officers in a unit of Russia’s Federal Security Service (FSB) with a pseudonym – the Operational Intelligence Department – but an ominous mission: to ensure the decapitation of the Ukrainian government and oversee the installation of a pro-Russian regime. The messages were a measure of confidence in this bold plan. So confident were FSB operatives that they would soon control the levers of power in Kyiv, according to Ukrainian and Western officials, that they spent the days leading up to the war arranging safe houses or accommodation in informants’ apartments and other locations for the planned influx of personnel. “Nice trip!” one FSB officer told another sent to oversee the expected takeover, according to the intercepted communications. There is no indication that the recipient ever made it to the capital, as the FSB’s plans collapsed midway retreat of Russian forces in the first months of the war. The communications revealing these preparations are part of a wider trove of sensitive material obtained by Ukraine and other security agencies and reviewed by The Washington Post. They offer rare insight into the activities of the FSB – a sprawling agency that bears enormous responsibility for the failed Russian war plan and the hubris that fueled it. An agency whose remit includes internal security in Russia as well as espionage in former Soviet states, the FSB has spent decades spying on Ukraine, trying to bring its institutions to account, paying off officials and working to prevent any perceived drift towards the West . No aspect of the FSB’s intelligence mission outside of Russia was more important than penetrating all levels of Ukrainian society. Story continues below ad Story continues below ad And yet, the agency has failed to incapacitate Ukraine’s government, foment any semblance of pro-Russian influence, or disrupt the power of President Volodymyr Zelensky. Its analysts either did not understand how forcefully Ukraine would respond, Ukrainian and Western officials said, or they did but could not or would not convey such sober assessments to Russian President Vladimir Putin. [Hubris and isolation led Vladimir Putin to misjudge Ukraine] The humiliations of the Russian military have largely overshadowed the failures of the FSB and other intelligence agencies. But in some ways, these were even more incomprehensible and consequential, said officials, who underpin almost every war decision in the Kremlin. “The Russians were wrong by a mile,” said a senior US official with regular access to classified information about Russia and its security services. “They made an entire war effort to seize strategic objectives that were beyond their capabilities,” the official said. “Russia’s mistake was really fundamental and strategic.” Ukraine’s security services have a vested interest in discrediting Russia’s spy services, but key details from the vault have been confirmed by Western government officials. The files show that the FSB unit responsible for Ukraine grew in size in the months leading up to the war and relied on the support of a vast network of paid agents in Ukraine’s security apparatus. Some have complied and are sabotaging Ukraine’s defenses, officials said, while others appear to have pocketed their FSB payments but were reluctant to do the Kremlin’s bidding when the fighting broke out. There are records that add to the mystery of Russian miscalculations. Extensive polls conducted for the FSB show that large sections of Ukraine’s population were prepared to resist Russian encroachment and that any expectation that Russian forces would be hailed as liberators was unfounded. Even so, officials said, the FSB continued to feed the Kremlin rosy estimates that Ukraine’s masses would welcome the arrival of the Russian military and the restoration of Moscow-friendly rule. “There was a lot of wishful thinking in the GRU and the military, but it started with the FSB,” said a senior Western security official, using the GRU acronym for Russia’s main military intelligence agency. “The sense that there would be flowers strewn in their wake — this was an FSB exercise.” He and other security officials in Ukraine, the United States and Europe spoke on condition of anonymity to discuss sensitive information. Story continues below ad Story continues below ad Adhering to these false assumptions, officials said, the FSB supported a war plan based on the idea that a blitzkrieg in Kyiv would topple the government within days. Zelensky would be dead, captured or exiled, creating a political vacuum for FSB agents to fill. Instead, FSB agents who had at some point reached the outskirts of Kiev had to do so retreat to Russian forces, Ukrainian security officials said. Instead of presiding over the formation of a new government in Kyiv, officials said, the FSB is now facing tough questions in Moscow about what its long history of operations against Ukraine accomplished — and the large sums that financed them. The FSB did not respond to requests for comment. The FSB’s plans and the efforts of Ukraine’s security services to thwart them—backed by the CIA, Britain’s MI6 and other Western intelligence agencies—are part of a shadow war that has taken place alongside Russia’s military campaign. It’s a conflict that was underway long before the February 24 invasion, and its battle lines are blurred by the tangled, overlapping histories of Russian agencies and their Ukrainian counterparts that began as descendants of the Soviet-era KGB. Six months into the war, neither side appears to have the clear upper hand. Ukraine’s security services have scored notable victories. Earlier, a Ukrainian non-governmental organization published what it described as a list of FSB officials linked to the war effort, publishing the identities and passport numbers of dozens of alleged spies in a move intended to disrupt the agency’s plans and rattle her staff. A person connected to the NGO, which is called Myrotvorets, or Peacemaker, said the data was obtained by Ukrainian security services. The person spoke on condition of anonymity, citing threats to his safety. Ivan Bakanov, who headed the SBU, Ukraine’s main internal security agency, at the start of the war. (Emily Sabens/The Washington Post; Efrem Lukatsky/AP; iStock) At the same time, Ukraine’s main internal security service, the SBU, struggled to rid its ranks of Russian moles and saboteurs. Several senior officers were arrested and branded traitors by Zelensky, who took the extraordinary step in July of removing SBU Director Ivan Bakanov — a childhood friend — from his post. Putin is not believed to have taken similar action against any of his spy chiefs, despite the extent of their miscalculations. “If your security services put such a high priority on understanding Ukraine, and your military plan is based on that understanding, how could they get it so wrong?” said William B. Taylor Jr., who served two terms as U.S. ambassador to Ukraine, including acting in 2019. “How could they assume that Ukrainians would not fight, that President Zelensky would not resist so bravely? The disconnect must be somewhere between the FSB and the top.”
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Among those planning to arrive in Kyiv in late February were Igor Kovalenko, identified by Ukraine as a senior FSB officer who for years was the main handler of some of Ukraine’s most prominent politicians and government officials secretly on the Kremlin’s payroll, including members of the opposition party chaired by Viktor Medvedchuk, a close friend of Putin. An exchange Kovalenko had with an FSB subordinate on February 18 suggested he had his eye on an apartment in Kiev’s leafy Obolon neighborhood, overlooking the Dnieper River. The intercepted communications show that Kovalenko asked for the apartment’s address and contact information for an FSB informant who occupied it. Ukrainian authorities said the resident was subsequently arrested and questioned. Igor Kovalenko, identified by Ukraine as a senior FSB officer, appeared to have his eye on an informant’s apartment in a building in Kiev’s Obolon neighborhood. (Emily Sabens/The Washington Post, Heidi Levine for The Washington Post, iStock) Kovalenko’s subordinate sent back the address, phone numbers and code words used to contact the whistleblower, who served in Zelensky’s government, Ukrainian officials said. Officials declined to identify the informant but said he admitted to being instructed by the FSB days before the raid to pack his belongings, leave his keys and leave the capital to ensure his personal safety during the initial phase of the war. Other whistleblowers arrested by Ukrainian authorities have provided similar accounts, one of the officials said. “They had been told, ‘When you come back, everything will be different.’ “ Details published by Peacemaker and confirmed by Ukrainian security officials describe Kovalenko as a 47-year veteran of the spy agency who in recent years was responsible for managing the agency’s secret ties to Ukraine’s parliament and the main pro-Russian party. Kovalenko did not respond to requests for comment. Ukrainian authorities believe Kovalenko may have been just a few miles from the capital in March, escorting Russian forces out of the city. But the FSB team tasked with staging operations in Kyiv had to abandon that plan when Russian forces began to retreat, officials said.
